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ABSTRACT
In 2019, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan struck down the FGM Act, a 1996 statute which makes
performing female genital mutilation a federal crime. The court held
that the FGM Act was an unconstitutional overstep of Congress’
authority to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce
Clause, since FGM is not “economic in nature.” Additionally, the court
held that the government could not justify the FGM Act as an exercise
of Congress’ authority to implement the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (the “ICCPR”), since the court did not
interpret the plain language of the treaty as a commitment to
eradicate FGM. This Note argues that although the court’s “economic
in nature” holding properly applied an increasingly narrow
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, its ICCPR holding failed to
consider extra-textual sources usually employed in treaty
interpretation. This Note also suggests that Congress may have
clearer authority to criminalize FGM if the United States ratified the
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(“CEDAW”), a treaty the United States has only signed.

ABSTRACT.............................................................................................. 1295
I.
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 1296
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2018, Fordham
University Rose Hill; Editor-in-Chief, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 44. I
would like to thank Professor Martin Flaherty for his guidance in writing this Note, as well
as the board and staff membersof the Fordham International Law Journal who edited this
Note. I would especially like to thank Anna, Lucy, and my parents for their consistent
support.

1295

1296
II.
III.

IV.

V.

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:5

INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC PREVALENCE OF
FGM .............................................................................................. 1301
THE FGM ACT EXCEEDS CONGRESS’S COMMERCE
POWER UNDER LOPEZ AND MORRISON .................... 1303
A. The Supreme Court Reigns in the Commerce Power
in Lopez and Morrison ................................................. 1304
B. Nagarwala’s Commerce Clause Interpretation: FGM
is not “Economic in Nature” ....................................... 1306
C. Criticism of the Nagarwala Opinion ....................... 1307
D. Transaction-Based Commerce Clause “Economics”
After Lopez and Morrison........................................... 1309
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO PASS TREATYIMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION AS A BASIS FOR
CRIMINALIZING FGM ........................................................... 1313
A. Congress’ Treaty-Implementing Power as Authority
for Legislation .................................................................. 1313
B. Holland as the Congress’ Basis for Implementing
VAWA under CEDAW.................................................... 1315
C. The Nagarwala Court Should Have Held that the
ICCPR Authorizes Congress to Criminalize FGM
................................................................................................ 1317
D. Congress Likely has the Authority to Pass the FGM
Act if the United States Ratifies CEDAW ............... 1320
E. The Post-Ratification Conduct of CEDAW Signatory
Nations Suggests that CEDAW Could be a Basis for
an FGM Ban in the United States.............................. 1323
CONCLUSION............................................................................ 1325

I. INTRODUCTION
Approximately 200 million women and girls worldwide are
victims of some form of female genital mutilation (“FGM”),1 defined
by the US Department of Health and Human Services as the
1. See G.A. Res. 71/168, at 2 (Feb. 2, 2017) [hereinafter G.A. Res.]; Female genital
mutilation
(FGM),
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
[WHO]
(2013),
https://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/fgm/prevalence/en/
[https://perma.cc/6HE6-22NM] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
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“piercing, cutting, removing, or sewing closed all or part of a girl’s
or woman’s external genitals for no medical reason.”2 Although the
cultural and religious practice is most common in Africa, the
Middle East, and Southeast Asia,3 researchers estimate that over
513,000 women and girls in the United States are FGM victims, or
are at risk of FGM.4 FGM is recognized as an egregious human
rights violation, as it increases a victim’s vulnerability to infection,
HIV, hepatitis, and reproductive health problems.5 Despite the
well-documented medical dangers associated with FGM,6 only
thirty-five states have criminalized FGM procedures as of 2019.7
In 1996, Congress passed the Female Genital Mutilation Act
(the “FGM Act”),8 which makes performing FGM on victims under
the age of eighteen a federal crime.9 Specifically, section 116(a)
imposes fines and/or imprisonment of no longer than five years for
anyone who “knowingly circumcises, excises, or infibulates the
whole or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of
another person who has not attained the age of 18 years.”10
2. Female Genital Mutilation or Cutting, OFF. WOMEN’S HEALTH (Apr. 1, 2019)
https://www.womenshealth.gov/a-z-topics/female-genital-cutting#17
[https://perma.cc/GN8V-8FMA].
3. See Jewel Llamas, Female Circumcision: The History, the Current Prevalence and the
Approach to a Patient (Apr. 2017), https://med.virginia.edu/family-medicine/wpcontent/uploads/sites/285/2017/01/Llamas-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RPU-X2PZ];
Wanda K. Jones et al., Female Genital Mutilation/Female Circumcision, PUBLIC HEALTH REP.
368,
370
(1997),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1381943/pdf/pubhealthrep000380014.pdf [https://perma.cc/XDX4-Y443].
4. See Howard Goldberg et al., Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in the United States:
Updated
Estimates
of
Women
and
Girls
at
Risk,
NIH
(2012),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4765983/
[https://perma.cc/CL85BSAN] (explaining that the study was unable to distinguish between women in the United
States who had actually undergone FGM, and women at risk of FGM).
5. See G.A. Res., supra note 1, at 2; Goldberg et al., supra note 4.
6. See
Health
Risks
of
Female
Genital
Mutilation
(FGM),
WHO,
https://www.who.int/sexual-and-reproductive-health/health-risks-of-female-genitalmutilation [https://perma.cc/9D9K-KKP7] (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
7. See
FGM
Legislation
by
State,
AHA
FOUNDATION,
https://www.theahafoundation.org/female-genital-mutilation/fgm-legislation-by-state/
[https://perma.cc/9YJ8-L6SV] (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 116(a) (1996).
9. See id.; Michelle E. Shember, Female Genital Mutilation and the First Amendment:
An Analysis of State Fgm Statutes and the Right to Free Exercise, 96 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
431, 436 (2019); Sohail Wahedi, The Health Law Implications of Ritual Circumcisions, 22
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 209, 212 (2019).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 116(a) (1996).
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Although the FGM Act has been in effect since 1996, the US
Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) has only brought charges under
the act twice: once in 200511 and more recently in United States v.
Nagarwala,12 which is the first time the constitutionality of the
FGM Act has been challenged as exceeding the scope of
Congressional authority.13
In Nagarwala, eight defendants were charged under the FGM
Act for performing or assisting in the FGM of four young girls in
Michigan.14 The government alleged that emergency room
physician Dr. Jumana Nagarwala performed the FGM with
assistants Farida Attar and Tahera Shafiq.15 The indictment further
alleged that Dr. Fakhruddin Attar allowed Dr. Nagarwala to use his
clinic in Michigan for the procedures.16 The four mothers of the
victims, members of the Dawoodi Bohra Shiite Muslim community,
were also charged for bringing their daughters to the clinic from
Michigan, Illinois, and Minnesota, knowing that their daughters
would be mutilated.17 Some of the daughters later told police that
the mothers had told them they were going on a “special girls trip,”
and that they were going to a doctor’s office to “get the germs
out.”18 Bohras who practice FGM disagree over the cultural
purpose for the procedure.19 Where some see it as a method of
11. See United States. v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613, 627 (E.D. Mich. 2018); TWO
WHO PLOTTED TO PERFORM FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION SENTENCED TO FEDERAL
PRISON,
DEP’T
OF
JUST.
(June
8,
2005),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/cac/Pressroom/pr2005/089.html
[https://perma.cc/KR7Z-2M78]; Daniel Rice, Female Genital Mutilation and the Treaty
Power:
What
Congress
Can
Do,
JUST
SECURITY
(Oct.
29,
2019),
https://www.justsecurity.org/66757/female-genital-mutilation-and-the-treaty-powerwhat-congress-can-do/ [https://perma.cc/92WJ-LXPD] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
12. See Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 613.
13. See Pam Belluck, Federal Ban on Female Genital Mutilation Ruled Unconstitutional
by Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/health/fgmfemale-genital-mutilation-law.html [https://perma.cc/8R9Q-DHEZ].
14. See Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 615–16.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.; Belluck, supra note 13.
18. Criminal Complaint at 7, United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D.
Mich.
2018),
available
at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/957381/download [https://perma.cc/JA9F-PGKC].
19. Fahrinisa Campana, In India’s Dawoodi Bohra community, there’s a growing
debate
about
FGM,
PUB.
RADIO
INTL.
(Aug.
2,
2018,
9:45AM),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-08-02/indias-dawoodi-bohra-community-theresgrowing-debate-about-fgm [https://perma.cc/N9NC-CDN8]; Tasneem Raja, I Underwent
Genital Mutilation as a Child—Right Here in the United States, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 21, 2017),
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curbing female promiscuity, others falsely believe it promotes
hygiene.20 Although the government alleged that Dr. Nagarwala
performed FGM on nine victims,21 federal prosecutors estimated
that Dr. Nagarwala may have actually performed FGM on over one
hundred girls.22
First, Judge Bernard A. Friedman of the Eastern District of
Michigan held that the FGM Act was not a valid exercise of
Congress’s power to pass treaty-implementing legislation.23 The
government attempted to rely on two provisions in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the “ICCPR”),
a 1966 United Nations treaty with seventy-four signatory parties,
to justify the federal FGM ban.24 Article 3 is the United States’ treaty
commitment to “ensure the equal right of men and women to the
enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present
Covenant,”25 and Article 24 states that “[e]very child shall have,
without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to
such measures of protection as are required by his status as a
minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.”26 The court
explained that “as laudable as the [FGM Act] may be,” FGM bears
no rational relationship to the ICCPR treaty provisions, and is
therefore not a valid exercise of Congress’s power to pass treatyimplementing legislation.27
Second, the court held that the government cannot justify the
FGM Act as a valid exercise of Congress’ power to regulate

https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/04/genital-cutting-indian-doctor-womenkhatna/ [https://perma.cc/33J3-SS3K].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, ICE fights to protect girls and women from
mutilation and abuse, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-fights-protect-girls-and-women-mutilationand-abuse [https://perma.cc/VH4R-S8EE]; Robert Snell, Genital mutilation case could
involve up to 100 victims, DETROIT NEWS (June 7, 2017, 4:25PM)
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2017/06/07/fedsestimate-genital-mutilation-victims/102594478/ [https://perma.cc/9F8U-2XSF].
23. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 620-21.
24. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
25. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 617-18; ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 3.
26. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 617-18; ICCPR supra note 24, art. 4.
27. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 618.
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interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause.28 Although the
Commerce Clause has been a broad source of Congressional
authority for most of the Twentieth Century,29 the Supreme Court
in the last three decades has narrowed Congress’s commerce
power by requiring that the regulated activity be “economic in
nature” for the law to find justification under the Commerce
Clause.30 The court in Nagarwala reasoned that since FGM is a
“form of physical assault” and not an “[illegal] healthcare service,”
it is not “economic in nature,” and the federal ban is an
unconstitutional overstep of Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority.31
The DOJ initially appealed the District Court’s decision to the
US Circuit Court for the Sixth Circuit in 2018,32 but informed the US
Senate (the “Senate”) that it would withdraw from its appeal in an
April 10, 2019 letter.33 The letter explains that the DOJ “reluctantly
concluded” that it had no reasonable defense of the FGM Act
provision.34 In response, the US House of Representatives (the
“House”) moved to intervene and argue the constitutionality of the
FGM Act on appeal.35 After the House’s motion to intervene, the
DOJ opposed the motion by moving to withdraw its appeal, which
28. Id. at 629-30.
29. See United States v. Durham, 902 F.3d 1180, 1200 (10th Cir. 2018) (“Between
1937 and 1995, the Court did not invalidate one federal law under the [Interstate
Commerce Clause]”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3.4.4 (5th ed. 2015).
30. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560-61 (1995) (holding that the GunFree School Zone Act’s federal ban on possessing a firearm near a school zone exceeds
Congress’s commerce power, since “mere possession” of a firearm is not an economic
activity); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (holding that the
Violence Against Women Act’s creation of a federal cause of action for sexual assault
victims exceeds Congress’s commerce power, since sexual assault is not “economic in
nature”).
31. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 630.
32. Notice of Appeal, United States v. Nagarwala, No. 19-1015 (6th Cir. filed Jan. 3,
2019); Rice, supra note 11.
33. Letter from Noel J. Franisco, Solicitor General of the United States to Diane
Feinstein, Ranking Member of the Committee on the Judiciary, DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 10,
2019),
https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/osg-530dletters/4_10_2019/download [https://perma.cc/TY9W-X3VF].
34. Id.
35. Reply Brief in Support of Motion of the U.S. House of Representatives to
Intervene, United States v. Nagarwala, No. 19-1015 (6th Cir. filed June 7, 2019), available
at
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/icap/wpcontent/uploads/sites/32/2019/06/Nagarwala-Reply-Brief-in-Support-of-Motion-toIntervene.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KFF-BC4L].
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was granted by the court.36 Daniel Rice, counsel for the House for
its motion to intervene, has suggested that the DOJ did “everything
in its power” to prevent a constitutional defense of the FGM Act by
withdrawing and opposing the motion to intervene.37
Part II of this Note will provide a brief explanation of the
international prevalence of FGM, and discuss its spread to the
United States. Part III will explain the Nagarwala Court’s holding
that the FGM Act exceeds Congress’s authority under the
Commerce Clause. Part III will suggest that Judge Friedman’s
Commerce Clause holding correctly applies United States v. Lopez
and United States v. Morrison’s narrow Commerce Clause
interpretation requiring the regulated activity to be “economic in
nature.”
Part IV will address the Nagarwala Court’s treaty
interpretation of the ICCPR. The Note will first explain Congress’s
authority under Missouri v. Holland to pass legislation “necessary
and proper” to implement treaties, even if the legislation exceeds
Congress’s commerce power. Next, the Note will argue that the
Nagarwala Court correctly concluded that the FGM ban is not a
valid implementation of ICCPR Article 3. With respect to ICCPR
Article 24, Part IV will suggest that Judge Friedman’s analysis
neglected to consult extra-textual sources usually employed in
treaty interpretation. Finally, Part IV will suggest that Congress
might justify the FGM Act under its treaty-implementing power if
the United States were to ratify the Convention on the Elimination
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”), a treaty
the United States has signed but not ratified.
II. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC PREVALENCE OF FGM
Although the precise origin of FGM is unknown, the practice is
most prevalent in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast
Asia.38 Initially, the United Nations and World Health Organization
referred to the dangerous practice as “female circumcision” in its
studies.39 Since the 1990s, however, the practice has widely been
known as “female genital mutilation.”40 Some advocates of FGM,
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Rice, supra note 11.
Id.
Llamas, supra note 3; Jones et al., supra note 3, at 370.
Llamas, supra note 3.
Id.
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usually from the areas in which the practice is prevalent, prefer the
name “circumcision” to “mutilation” due to its religious and
cultural significance.41
UNICEF estimates that FGM is almost a universal practice in
Somalia, Guinea, and Yemen, with rates around ninety percent.42
Although a majority of women in most countries in Africa and the
Middle East think the practice should end, over half of the female
population in Mali, Sierra Leone, Guinea, the Gambia, Somalia, and
Egypt thinks the practice should continue.43 The justifications for
FGM vary from culture to culture, but it is often performed to
preserve virginity, improve hygiene, engage in religious tradition,
or serve as a cultural “rite of passage.”44 The World Health
Organization has recognized that older women who have
undergone FGM “often become gatekeepers of the practice” in their
communities, which entails preparing females for FGM,
performing FGM, and punishing females who refuse to undergo
FGM.45
Although international FGM rates have declined over the last
three decades,46 the practice has spread to areas of Australia, North
America, and Europe, corresponding to the frequency of migrants
from the countries where FGM is prevalent.47 A 2013 study found
that in the United States, approximately 500,000 women and girls
are victims of FGM, or are at risk of FGM.48 California, New York,
and Minnesota have the most FGM victims or people at risk of
FGM,49 and FGM is most prevalent in urban centers of the United
States like New York, Washington, D.C., Minneapolis, Los Angeles,
41. Jones et al., supra note 3, at 370.
42. Female
genital
mutilation
(FGM),
UNICEF
DATA (Feb.
2020),
https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-protection/female-genital-mutilation/
[https://perma.cc/6GHL-P8MJ] [hereinafter UNICEF]; see Michelle Krupa, The alarming
rise of female genital mutilation in America, CNN HEALTH (July 14, 2017, 10:06 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/11/health/female-genital-mutilation-fgm-explainertrnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/9SUC-YG96].
43. UNICEF, supra note 42.
44. Jones et al., supra note 3, at 370.
45. Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Coyne, The Identity Economics of Female Genital
Mutilation, 48 J. DEVELOPING AREAS 137, 139, 146 (2014).
46. UNICEF, supra note 42.
47. Id.; Goldberg et al., supra note 4.
48. Population Reference Bureau [PRB], U.S. Women and Girls Potentially at Risk for
FGM/C, by State, 2013 Preliminary Data, PRB (2013), https://assets.prb.org/pdf15/usfgmc-all-states-table.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7FA-Z695].
49. Id.
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and Seattle.50 A Centers for Disease Control (the “CDC”) study
found an increase in FGM rates in the United States between 19902000,51 which reiterates the notion that the increase is a result of
rapid growth in numbers of immigrants from countries where FGM
is prevalent during those years.52
III. THE FGM ACT EXCEEDS CONGRESS’S COMMERCE POWER
UNDER LOPEZ AND MORRISON
This section will suggest that the Nagarwala Court’s holding
that the FGM Act exceeds Congress’s Commerce Power seems to
correctly apply the Supreme Court’s narrow reading of the
Commerce Clause in Lopez and Morrison, contrary to the
arguments of the government,53 Daniel Rice,54 and women’s rights
group AHA Foundation55 (whether the narrow Commerce Clause
interpretation in Lopez and Morrison is convincing is beyond the
scope of this Note).
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution
(the “Commerce Clause”) authorizes Congress “to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with Indian Tribes.”56 For most of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause
allowed Congress wide regulatory authority. Between 1937-1995,
the Supreme Court consistently upheld Congressional legislation
under a lenient test, 57 where Congress had the authority to (1)
regulate interstate travel, as long as the law does not violate

50. Ranit Mishori et al., Female Genital Mutilation or Cutting, AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN (Jan.
1, 2018), https://www.aafp.org/afp/2018/0101/p49.html [https://perma.cc/CT9FXYU8].
51. Goldberg et al., supra note 4.
52. Id.
53. United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613, 617–18 (E.D. Mich. 2018).
54. Rice, supra note 11.
55. Brief of Amicus Curiae AHA Foundation in Support of the United States of America
at 9–14, United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (No. 18-mc51358).
56. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 [hereinafter Commerce Clause].
57. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937); United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964).
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another Constitutional provision,58 and (2) regulate any activity
having a close or substantial relationship to, or effect on interstate
commerce.59 The second category of commerce power was
especially broad, since the relationship to interstate commerce
could be merely theoretical.60 Under this standard, the Supreme
Court did not find a single federal law to exceed Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority from 1937-1995.61
A. The Supreme Court Reigns in the Commerce Power in Lopez and
Morrison
In 1995, the Supreme Court in Lopez held that a provision of
the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, banning the possession of
firearms near school zones, exceeded Congress’ power under the
Commerce Clause.62 Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion
identified three separate categories of activity which Congress has
the authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause (the Lopez
Court divided the first traditional commerce category described
above into two distinct categories):63
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of
interstate commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate
58. See Thomson v. Union Pacific R.R., 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 579, 19 L.Ed. 792 (1870);
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 14 S. Ct. 891, 38 L.Ed. 808 (1894); 1 TREATISE
ON CONST. L. § 4.8(a) (explaining that this first category authorizes Congress to regulate
essentially anything or anyone which crosses state lines) [hereinafter Modern Commerce
Power Tests].
59. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326
(1977); Modern Commerce Power Tests, supra note 58, § 4.8(a).
60. See Wickard, 317 U.S. 111 (holding that a federal wheat quota applied to a farmer
was justified under the Commerce Clause, even though the farmer grew the wheat for selfconsumption and not for sale. The court reasoned that theoretically, many farmers
growing wheat for self-consumption could affect the supply and demand for wheat, which
could affect interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. 241 (holding that
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provision banning discrimination at private businesses was a
valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Power, since discrimination at businesses would
theoretically affect people’s interstate travel destinations, and the places travelers would
spend money); § 4.8(a)Modern Commerce Power Tests, supra note 58.
61. See United States v. Durham, 902 F.3d 1180, 1200 (10th Cir. 2018);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, § 3.4.4.
62. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
63. Modern Commerce Power Tests, supra note 58, § 4.8(a).

2020]

UNITED STATES V. NAGARWALA

1305

activities. Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the
power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation
to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce.64

Only the third category of commerce power was at issue in
Lopez,65 and it was the only category at issue in Nagarwala.66 The
Lopez majority articulated the rule for Congressional authority
under this third category: first, the regulated activity must have a
“substantial effect” on interstate commerce.67 Second, the Court
will give less deference to federal legislation if it does not regulate
“economic activity.”68 This “economic activity” prong is
particularly relevant for the Nagarwala Court’s rejection of the
FGM Act.69
With respect to the first prong, the Court rejected the
government’s argument that gun possession in school zones might
affect interstate commerce, since gun violence takes a toll on the
national economy.70 Justice Rehnquist explained that allowing
Congress to regulate activity with such a tenuous relationship to
interstate commerce would allow Congress to regulate virtually
any activity.71 Under the second prong, the Lopez Court held that
possession of guns near school zones is “in no sense an economic
activity,” rendering this provision of the Gun-Free School Zone Act
outside of Congress’ commerce power.72 Although Justice
Kennedy’s Lopez concurrence indicates that a majority of justices
thought this “economic activity” holding was not a rejection of

64. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
65. Id. at 559.
66. United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613, 622 (E.D. Mich. 2018).
67. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 563; Modern Commerce Power Tests, supra note 58, §
4.8(a) (Although the “substantial effect” language used by the Lopez majority is consistent
with the Commerce Clause precedent from 1937-1995, it has been argued that the
commerce cases prior to Lopez are more accurately interpreted as requiring an
“insignificant or trivial” effect on interstate commerce); Deborah Jones
Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 677 (1995).
68. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (“Where economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”); Modern Commerce
Power Tests, supra note 58, § 4.8(a).
69. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 627.
70. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64.
71. Id. at 564.
72. Id. at 567.
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Commerce Clause precedent,73 this narrow reading requiring the
regulated activity to be “commercial in nature”74 is seen as a
dramatic shift in the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence.75
After Lopez, the Congressionally regulated activity must not only
have a theoretical impact on interstate commerce—there must
also be something about the activity that is intrinsically economic.76
Five years later, the Supreme Court applied Lopez’s narrow
Commerce Clause interpretation in Morrison.77 In Morrison, the
Court struck down a provision of the Violence Against Women Act
(“VAWA”) granting women a federal cause of action for sexual
assault.78 The Court held that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of
violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”79
Although violence against women would likely satisfy the lenient
“aggregate effect on interstate commerce” prong,80 the Court held
that it is not an intrinsically commercial activity under Lopez.81
After Lopez and Morrison, an activity must be “economic in nature”
for Congress to be able to regulate it under the commerce power.82
B. Nagarwala’s Commerce Clause Interpretation: FGM is not
“Economic in Nature”
In Nagarwala, Judge Friedman applied the narrow “economic
in nature” standard from Lopez and Morrison to strike down the
Congressional criminalization of FGM.83 First, the government
argued that the FGM Act is within Congress’ commerce power by
73. Id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing the country’s “immense stake in the
stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence”); see generally 3 WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 35:6 (3d ed. 2011).
74. Id. at 627 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 628–29 (“The second legal problem the Court creates comes from its
apparent belief that it can reconcile its holding with earlier cases by making a critical
distinction between ‘commercial’ and noncommercial “transaction[s]”).
76. David M. Driesen, The Economic/Nonecononic Activity Distinction Under the
Commerce Clause, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV.337, 344-45 (2016).
77. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
78. Id. at 598, 627.
79. Id. at 613.
80. Id. at 610.
81. Id. at 634 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing a Congressional finding that gendermotivated violence impacts interstate commerce by “deterring potential victims from
traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from
transacting with business, and in places involved, in interstate commerce”).
82. Id. at 613.
83. United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613, 627-28 (E.D. Mich. 2018).
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attempting to emphasize the existence of an interstate market for
FGM.84 The court explained that the government failed to show that
such a market exists, holding that FGM was a “purely local” crime
in the realm of state authority.”85 Next, the court rejected the
government’s argument that FGM is an “illegal form of healthcare,”
where healthcare is considered an intrinsically economic activity
within Congress’ commerce power.86 The court explained that
“FGM is a form of physical assault, not anything approaching a
healthcare service.”87 Judge Friedman analogized the FGM Act to
the Gun-Free School Zone Act in Lopez by suggesting that
performing FGM, like possessing a gun in a school zone, is a
“criminal act that ‘has nothing to do with commerce or any sort of
economic enterprise.’”88
C. Criticism of the Nagarwala Opinion
The Nagarwala Court’s Commerce Clause holding was met
with criticism by legal scholars and women’s rights activists.
Daniel Rice89 argues that the Nagarwala Court misapplied the
language from Bond v. United States, which suggests that Congress
cannot regulate “purely local” crimes under its commerce power,
which are left to the authority of the states.90 He suggests that a
relevant consideration in determining whether a crime is “purely
local” is “whether the international community has condemned the
relevant practice and joined together to eradicate it.”91 Daniel Rice
points to statements from the United Nations, the Trump
Administration, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”), the DOJ, and others condemning FGM and recognizing it as
a great international concern.92 Further, he points out that FGM
often occurs “transnationally,” as FGM performers and victims are
often transported for the procedure, as in Nagarwala.93 For these
84. Id. at 627.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 628.
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 628 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
89. Counsel for the House in its motion to intervene in the Nagarwala appeal.
90. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 619-20 (quoting Bond v. United States, 572 U.S.
844, 856 (2014)).
91. Rice, supra note 11.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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reasons, Daniel Rice disagrees with the Nagarwala Court’s holding
that FGM is a “purely local” crime in the realm of state authority.94
Although Daniel Rice presents a convincing argument that
FGM cannot be considered a “purely local” activity, the argument
fails to address the major consideration of Lopez and Morrison’s
Commerce Clause analysis—the “economic in nature” prong.
Daniel Rice briefly addresses the economic ramifications of FGM,
correctly suggesting that medical complications caused by FGM
take a toll on the national economy by increasing healthcare costs,
and that FGM providers are often compensated.95 This point,
however, only seems to establish the lenient Commerce Clause test
used before Lopez, requiring only that the regulated activity have
an impact on interstate commerce in the aggregate.96 After the
narrow interpretation of Lopez and Morrison, the regulated activity
must also be “economic in nature.”97 Examining the economic
impact of FGM is not enough after Lopez and Morrison. Now, the
court must also find something intrinsically economic or
commercial about the activity for Congress to have the authority to
regulate the activity under the Commerce Clause.
The AHA Foundation (“AHA”) submitted an amicus curiae
brief in Nagarwala which more directly addresses the “economic
in nature” prong, though it ultimately fails to demonstrate that
FGM is inherently “economic” or “commercial” under the narrow
interpretation of Lopez and Morrison, and the Supreme Court’s
characterization of “economics.”98 AHA first points out that FGM is
“generally bought and paid for.”99 They cite findings that families
often pool resources to pay for a provider to perform FGM on
groups of girls, and that many FGM providers perform FGM as their
source of livelihood.100 The government’s brief in Nagarwala
makes a similar attempt to characterize FGM as economic, pointing
out that Dr. Nagarwala’s FGM in Michigan was performed with
“commercially-sold medical tools and supplies.”101 AHA also
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
97. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
98. Brief of Amicus Curiae AHA Foundation in Support of the United States of America
at 1, United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (No. 18-mc-51358).
99. Id. at 12.
100. Id. at 12-13.
101. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 628.
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supports the economic nature of FGM by pointing out that in some
cultures, the practice is used for the “insidious” purpose of
increasing the desirability of an FGM victim as a bride, which
increases the “bride price” for the victim’s family upon marriage.102
Although these are circumstances where FGM could relate to
an economic transaction, AHA’s argument does not establish that
FGM meets Lopez and Morrison’s both high and narrow standard of
“economic in nature.”103 In Lopez, the Supreme Court seems to
reason that although gun possession in a school zone could be part
of an economic transaction (the defendant in Lopez actually
brought the gun to his school to sell for US$40), the dispositive
question is whether the activity is inherently economic or
commercial104—whether it is an activity inextricably linked to
economic activity.
D. Transaction-Based Commerce Clause “Economics” After Lopez
and Morrison
To determine whether FGM meets this standard, it is
necessary to examine the meaning of “economic” or “commercial”
in the Commerce Clause context. The Lopez Court did not articulate
a precise test for its distinction between “commercial” and
“noncommercial” activity,105 nor did the Morrison Court define its
phrase “economic in nature.”106 This lack of clarity could leave
judges susceptible to applying their personal conceptions of
“economics” in Commerce Clause challenges.107
Judge Richard Posner, a major figure in the Law and
Economics movement, broadly defines “economics” as “the science
of rational choice in a world - our world - in which resources are
limited in relation to human wants.”108 Author Scott Powers makes
102. Brief of Amicus Curiae AHA Foundation in Support of the United States of
America at 13, United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (No. 18mc-51358).
103. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
104. Michael E. Rosman, Facial Challenges and the Commerce Clause: Rethinking
Lopez and Morrison, 4 FAULKNER L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2012).
105. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
106. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
107. Scott T. Powers, Commerce—A Retreat from Clarity: The Supreme Court Adds a
Wrinkle to the “Aggregated Effects” Doctrine of its Commerce Clause Jurisprudence—United
States v. Morrison, 519 U.S. 598 (2000), 75 TEMPLE L. REV. 163, 194-96 (2002).
108. Id. at 196.
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the point that under this broad definition, the assault of a woman
in Morrison or possession of a gun in Lopez would certainly be
inherently economic.109 In both cases, the perpetrators made
choices to “[expend] personal resources” to satisfy personal
“wants,” which satisfies Judge Posner’s broad definition.110 The fact
that the Court in Lopez and Morrison determined that gun
possession and the assault of a woman are not “economic in
nature” (or “noncommercial”) suggests that the Court did not
accept Judge Posner’s broad view in Commerce Clause cases.
Alternatively, economist Ronald Coase, creator of the “Coase
Theorem” in law and economics,111 advocates a more limited
definition of “economics,” characterizing it as “only [the]
traditional institutions which bind together our economy, such as:
firms, markets for goods and services, labor markets, capital
markets, the banking system and international trade.”112
Regardless of which view of “economics” is more convincing,
the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence is shifting
toward Coase’s more limited, transactional definition. In Gonzales
v. Raich, the Court considered whether Congress has the authority
under the Commerce Clause to pass provisions of the Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”) prohibiting the local cultivation and use of
marijuana.113 In holding that Congress could regulate this activity
under its commerce power, Justice Stevens explained that
Congress can regulate noneconomic activity by passing laws which
are “essential [parts] of a larger regulation of economic activity, in
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated.”114 In other words, Congress can
pass laws regulating noneconomic activity if the law is part of an
“ambitious, far-reaching federal regulation.”115

109. Id. at 195-96.
110. Id.
111. Steven G. Medema & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr, The Coase Theorem, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 836 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds., 2000).
112. Ronald H. Coase, Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 20607 (1978); see Powers, supra note 107, at 194-96.
113. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
114. Id. at 24.
115. Ann Schober, United States v. Morrison 15 Years Later: How the Supreme Court’s
Disjointed Adjudication of Commerce Clause Legislation Opens A Back Door to Restoring
Federal Civil Recourse for Certain Victims of Gender-Based Violence, 34 J. L. & COM. 161, 175
(2015).
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In his discussion of “economics,” Justice Stevens distinguished
marijuana production and use from the regulated activities in
Lopez and Morrison:
Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison the activities
regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic.
“Economics” refers to “the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities.” Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 720 (1966). The CSA is a statute that
regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative,
interstate market.116

Justice O’Connor, in her Gonzales dissent, argues that this
dictionary definition of “economics” is too broad.117 The majority’s
focus on “production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities,” however, seems to fit with Coase’s limited
characterization of economics involving firms, markets for goods
and services, and labor markets – not Posner’s general view of
general “choices” in the face of limited resources.118
FGM thus cannot be considered “economic in nature” under
the narrow standard of Lopez and Morrison, as informed by the
“economics” discussion in Raich. First, the “nature” of FGM does
not inherently involve the “production, distribution, [or]
consumption of commodities.”119 As discussed, Lopez seems to
require that the activity be inextricably tied to economic activity –
in other words, the activity cannot occur in a noneconomic way for
Congress to be able to regulate it under the Commerce Clause.120
AHA’s suggestion that FGM is usually performed for compensation,
and that it often used to increase a victim’s “bride price”121 only
provides an example of when the practice can be tied to a
transactional economic exchange. FGM is frequently performed in
116. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25-26.
117. Id. at 49 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority’s broad definition
of “economics” as “breathtaking”).
118. See Coase, supra note 112.
119. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25–26.
120. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (holding that possession of
a gun in a school zone is a noncommercial activity and outside Congress’ Commerce Clause
authority, even though the gun in the Lopez case was brought to school to be sold for $40).
121. Brief of Amicus Curiae AHA Foundation in Support of the United States of
America at 13, United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (No. 18mc-51358).
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the home by family members or neighbors, a gruesome situation in
which compensation is unlikely.122
Further, although FGM is frequently used for the horrific
purpose of increasing a victim’s “bride price” (which likely fits with
Raich’s transactional, commodity-based approach to “economics”),
increasing bride price is not a purpose inherently tied to FGM. The
United Nations Population Fund (the “UNPF”) lists other
prominent purposes for FGM besides increasing the marriage
“value” of a victim, where these purposes vary by culture and
religion, and can exist independently of each other.123 Additionally,
many cultures perform FGM under the mistaken idea that it
improves hygiene, or “aesthetic appeal.”124 FGM is also performed
in some cultures for the purpose of adhering to religious doctrine
requiring the practice,125 and some cultures see FGM as a method
of preserving virginity before marriage.126
Although attempts to improve hygiene and aesthetics, adhere
to religious doctrine, and attempts to preserve virginity could be
seen as “economic” activities under Judge Posner’s broad
definition, they do not fit the limited transactional definition used
in Raich’s Commerce Clause discussion. It is difficult to conceive of
a practice performed for religious beliefs (in the home, without
compensation) as related to some kind of market transaction or
“commodity.” The possibility of FGM being performed without any
connection to “economics” as characterized by Raich suggests that
122. Immigr. & Refugee Board of Can., Somalia: Information on female genital
mutilation in Somalia, on the methods used in various regions and on the consequences of
refusal; also, information on the presence in Somalia of women’s organizations concerned
with
this
issue,
REFWORLD
(Sept.
1,
1996),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aaab44.html
[https://perma.cc/W32J-GV84];
Delegation of the Eur. Union to Guinea, Female Genital Mutilation… EU resolute to end this
torture! (Feb. 6, 2019), https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/guinea/57697/femalegenital-mutilation%E2%80%A6-eu-resolute-end-torture_az
[https://perma.cc/4D8YWVQU].
123. See U.N. Population Fund, Female genital mutilation (FGM) frequently asked
questions, U.N. POPULATION FUND (July 2019), https://www.unfpa.org/resources/femalegenital-mutilation-fgm-frequently-asked-questions#
[https://perma.cc/SC89-NFMU]
[hereinafter U.N. Population Fund]; G.A. Res., supra note 1 (stating that “[w]here it is
believed that being cut increases marriageability, FGM is more likely to be carried out.”
This implies that FGM is not used to increase marriageability in all cultures, or in every
instance).
124. U.N. Population Fund, supra note 123.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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it is not inherently “economic in nature,” since Lopez suggests that
an activity cannot fall under Congress’s Commerce power if it can
be performed in a noneconomic way.127
IV. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO PASS TREATYIMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION AS A BASIS FOR CRIMINALIZING
FGM
Under Missouri v. Holland, Congress has the authority to pass
legislation “necessary and proper” for implementing a treaty, even
if the legislation regulates an activity outside Congress’s
Commerce Power.128 This Section will first explain Congress’
treaty-implementing power under Holland, and illustrate its
application by showing how Congress might have the authority to
criminalize violence against women if CEDAW were ratified. Next,
this Section will explain the Nagarwala Court’s holding that the
FGM Act is not a valid exercise of Congress’ treaty-implementing
power (in Nagarwala, the treaty at issue is the ICCPR). This Section
will point out that Daniel Rice makes a strong case that the District
Court ignored Supreme Court precedent requiring a broad inquiry
of treaty interpretation tools beyond the plain text of the ICCPR.
The Section will conclude by pointing out that the United States’
ratification of CEDAW would likely give Congress a basis to pass
the FGM Act under its treaty-implementing power.
A. Congress’ Treaty-Implementing Power as Authority for
Legislation
The Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution states that
“[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”129 Although there is debate
on the actual meaning of this language, the decisions in Lopez and
Morrison suggest that it acts a “shield” for the states, reserving
authority not granted to Congress under Article I to the states.130
127. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
128. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
129. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
130. See Martin Flaherty, Are We to be a Nation?: Federal Powers vs “States ‘ Rights”
in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277, 1283 (1999) (explaining the “shield” view of
federalism). For the alternative interpretation of the Tenth Amendment as a “truism,” see
United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (“The amendment states but a

1314

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:5

For example, Morrison’s holding that VAWA exceeded Congress’
authority under its Article I commerce power “awakened” the
Tenth Amendment by concluding that a power not given to
Congress (regulating sexual assault) is reserved to the states,
although the majority never actually cites the Tenth Amendment
in its opinion.131
The 1920 opinion in Holland is seen as articulating an
exception to this Tenth Amendment state shield: Congress’ Article
I authority to pass laws implementing treaties.132 Holland stands
for the proposition that even if a regulated activity exceeds
Congress’ Article I authority (like violence against women or gun
possession), Congress can still regulate the activity if the law
implements a ratified treaty.133 The facts from Holland illustrate
this rule.134 In 1916, the United States and the United Kingdom
(acting for Canada) signed the Migratory Bird Treaty, which
contained an agreement to “adopt some uniform system of
protection” against the “indiscriminate slaughter” of migratory
birds.135 To implement this treaty, Congress passed the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act of 1918, which regulated the hunting and capture
of migratory birds in the United States.136 The State of Missouri
challenged the law, arguing that the regulation of wild game is a
reserved right of the states under the Tenth Amendment.137 Justice
Holmes rejected this argument, explaining that even if an activity’s
regulation is reserved for the states, Congress can regulate the
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history
of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between
the national and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before
the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national
government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be
able to exercise fully their reserved powers.”); Frandy St. Louis, The Decline of Mandatory
Physical Education in Grade Schools Resulted in the Current Childhood Obesity Crisis and
Consequently an Unsustainable Rise in Health Care Spending, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 629, 651
(2013).
131. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (referring to “areas of traditional state regulation”);
Warren Norred, Removing Mud in the Clean Water Act: The Ninth Amendment as a Limiting
Factor in Chevron Analysis, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 51, 74 (2007) (explaining the Court’s
reliance on the Tenth Amendment in Lopez and Morrison).
132. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
133. See id.
134. Id. at 430-32.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 431.
137. Id.
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activity under its constitutional authority to pass treatyimplementing legislation:
To answer this question it is not enough to refer to the Tenth
Amendment . . . because by Article II, § 2, the power to make
treaties is delegated expressly, and by Article VI treaties made
under the authority of the United States, along with the
Constitution and laws of the United States made in pursuance
thereof, are declared the supreme law of the land. If the treaty
is valid, there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute
under Article I, § 8 as a necessary and proper means to execute
the powers of the Government . . .138

B. Holland as Congress’ Basis for Implementing VAWA under
CEDAW
Another illustration of the Holland rule involves Morrison,
where the Court held that the provision of VAWA granting women
a federal cause of action for sexual assault exceeded Congress’
authority.139 Even though Congress does not have the authority to
pass the VAWA provision under Morrison, the rule from Holland
suggests that Congress would have such authority if the United
States ratified a treaty with a commitment to provide sexual
assault victims a federal cause of action. CEDAW, a 1979 United
Nations General Assembly treaty, has such a provision. CEDAW
General Recommendation 19 includes gender-based violence as a
kind of gender discrimination, which requires a judicial remedy
under CEDAW.140 Although UN general recommendations
(sometimes called “general comments”) are not legally binding,
they provide interpretive guidance by articulating how signatory
nations can fulfill their treaty obligations.141 The United States,
however, is the only nation in the Western Hemisphere that has not

138. Id. at 432.
139. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (“The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence
that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate
commerce has always been the province of the States”).
140. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992).
141. See United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002); Rice,
supra note 11; Lisa Davis, Preventing Torture: An Introduction to the Symposium Issue, 11
N.Y. CITY L. REV. 179, 180 (2008).
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yet ratified CEDAW.142 President Jimmy Carter only signed the
treaty in 1980, and treaties are not effective in the United States
until they are ratified.143 If the United States ratified CEDAW,
Congress might have the authority to pass the same VAWA
provision struck down by Morrison as a valid exercise of its Article
II treaty-implementing power under Holland.144
Holland’s removal of the Tenth Amendment as a barrier to
treaty-implementing legislation has been criticized as broadening
Congress’ regulatory authority.145 Justice Scalia’s concurrence in
Bond v. United States makes this point by suggesting that the
holding from Lopez could be reversed if the United States simply
“[negotiated] a treaty with Latvia providing that neither sovereign
would permit the carrying of guns near schools.”146 Professor
Michael Glennon argues, however, that Justice Scalia’s fears have
not materialized, since US treaties mostly focus on “bread-andbutter international issues”–not local activity traditionally
regulated by states, which is more likely to implicate the Tenth
Amendment.147 The Supreme Court had the opportunity to
overrule Holland in the 2014 criminal case Bond, but Chief Justice
Roberts dodged the question through statutory interpretation by
holding that the defendant’s conduct did not fall within the treatyimplementing statute.148
142. Johanna Kalb, Dynamic Federalism in Human Rights Treaty Implementation, 84
TUL. L. REV. 1025, 1034, 1060-61 n.185 (2010)
143. Id.
144. Barbara Stark, Domestic Violence and International Law: Good-Bye Earl (Hans,
Pedro, Gen, Chou, etc.), 47 LOY. L. REV. 255, 279 (2001). For another illustration of Congress’
authority to regulate activity under its treaty-implementing power, even though the
activity would normally exceed its enumerated powers, see Gerald L. Neuman, The Global
Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 33, 46 (1997) (arguing that even if the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act’s creation of religious exemptions exceeds Congressional
authority, Congress could justify the law as an implementation of the ICCPR’s guarantee of
the “[f]reedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs” under Holland).
145. See S. REP. NO. 412, 83RD CONG., 1ST SESS. 1 (1953) (Senator John Bricker
proposed a constitutional Amendment to overrule Holland and limit Congress’ treatyimplementing authority: “[a] treaty shall become effective as internal law only through
legislation which would be valid in the absence of a treaty.”); Charles A. Lofgren, Missouri
v. Holland in Historical Perspective, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 118.
146. Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 878 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).
147. Michael J. Glennon & Robert D. Sloane, The Sad, Quiet Death of Missouri v. Holland:
How Bond Hobbled the Treaty Power, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 58 (2016).
148. Stephanie Peral, Bond v. United States: Deciphering Missouri v. Holland and the
Scope of Congress’s Powers when Implementing a Non-Self-Executing Treaty, 9 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 179, 188 (2014).
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C. The Nagarwala Court Should Have Held That the ICCPR
Authorizes Congress to Criminalize FGM
The ICCPR, which was the treaty at issue in Nagarwala, was
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, and
went into effect in 1976.149 The United States ratified the treaty in
1992 with several reservations.150 One of the reservations is the
United States’ declaration that Articles 1 through 27 of the ICCPR
are not “self-executing.”151 A self-executing treaty “operates of
itself without the aid of any legislative provision,” meaning the
treaty becomes “the supreme law of the land” after ratification
without Congress implementing its provisions through
legislation.152 A non-self-executing treaty like the ICCPR, however,
requires Congress to use its treaty implementing power to enact
the provisions of the treaty as domestic law.153 Courts have held
that legislation implementing a treaty needs to be at least
“rationally related” to the treaty.154
The government in Nagarwala argued that the FGM Act can be
justified as an implementation of two provisions of the ICCPR:
Article 3 and Article 24.155 Article 3 of the ICCPR states that “[t]he
States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and
political rights set forth in the present Covenant.”156 In a brief
paragraph, the Nagarwala Court rejected the government’s
argument that the FGM Act was a “necessary and proper”
implementation of ICCPR Article 3, pointing out that there is no
149. ICCPR, supra note 24, at 171; Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Summary:
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), CCLA (Oct. 27, 2015),
https://ccla.org/summary-international-covenant-on-civil-and-political-rights-iccpr/
[https://perma.cc/YNS3-NNG2].
150. American Civil Liberties Union, FAQ: The Covenant on Civil & Political Rights
(ICCPR), ACLU (Apr. 2019), https://www.aclu.org/other/faq-covenant-civil-politicalrights-iccpr [https://perma.cc/32CQ-8W56]; U.S. reservations, declarations, and
understandings, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. S478101 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1999).
151. U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1999).
152. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S.
253, 299 (1829)).
153. Id.
154. United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)).
155. United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613, 617-18 (E.D. Mich. 2018).
156. ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 3.
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rational relationship between FGM and “civil and political
rights.”157 In the court’s view, civil and political rights include “the
freedom of expression, the right to participate in elections, and
protections for defendants in criminal proceedings,” while the FGM
Act seeks to ban a “particular form of physical abuse.”158
The court’s analysis of ICCPR Article 3, though brief, is likely
correct. Specific examples of the “civil and political rights” included
in the ICCPR are freedom of movement;159 the right to a fair and
public hearing by an impartial tribunal;160 freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion;161 peaceful assembly;162 freedom of
association with others;163 and protection of ethnic, religious, or
linguistic minorities.164 Although the ICCPR never defines “civil
and political rights,” the rights listed in the treaty suggest that the
ICCPR does not encompass FGM, a “particular form of physical
abuse.”165
The court’s more controversial holding is that the FGM Act is
not a valid implementation of ICCPR Article 24(1).166 Article 24(1)
of the ICCPR states that “[e]very child shall have, without any
discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national
or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of
protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of
his family, society and the State.”167 Even though the court
concedes that the relationship between Article 24(1) and the FGM
Act is “arguably closer” than that of Article 3, the court dismisses
the government’s argument in just two sentences: “Article 24 is an
anti-discrimination provision, which calls for the protection of
minors without regard to their race, color, sex, or other
characteristics. As laudable as the prohibition of a particular type
of abuse of girls may be, it does not logically further the goal of
protecting children on a nondiscriminatory basis.”168
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 618.
Id.
ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 12.
ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 14.
ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 18.
ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 21.
ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 22.
ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 27.
United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d 613, 618 (E.D. Mich. 2018).
Id.
ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 24(1).
Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 618.
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Judge Friedman essentially reasons that Article 24(1)’s
protection of children “without discrimination as to . . . sex,” has no
rational relationship to the FGM Act, which draws a sex-based
distinction by specifically protecting females.169 This brief, literal,
textual analysis ignores established Supreme Court precedent
regarding the tools of treaty interpretation. Although a conflict
existed between the Rehnquist Court justices regarding the
permissible sources of treaty interpretation, the 2008 decision in
Medellín v. Texas170 reaffirmed the Court’s willingness to utilize
interpretive tools beyond the plain text of treaties.171 The Court
recognized that although treaty interpretation should “begin with
[the treaty’s] text,” a ratified treaty is essentially “an agreement
among sovereign powers,” so the Court can consider “negotiation
and drafting history of the treaty as well as ‘the postratification
understanding’ of signatory nations.”172
Daniel Rice makes a strong case that Judge Friedman failed to
consider the “negotiation and drafting history” of the ICCPR in its
decision.173 When President George H.W. Bush transmitted the
ICCPR to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, his
administration included an “understanding,” explaining that
Article 24 could be interpreted in light of the UN Human Rights
Committee’s General Comments regarding gender discrimination
(the Human Rights Committee is the group responsible for
overseeing the ICCPR’s implementation).174 Although the George
H.W. Bush Administration’s “understanding” only references
General Comment 18, which explains nondiscrimination in
general,
General
Comment
28
elaborates
on
this
nondiscrimination concept by clarifying that countries should ban
“cultural or religious practices which jeopardize the freedom and
well-being of female children,” which seems to encompass FGM.175
Perhaps the strongest indicator from the Human Rights Committee
that the ICCPR combats FGM is the Human Rights Committee’s
169. Rice, supra note 11.
170. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 491 (2008).
171. David J. Bederman, Medellín’s New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 102 AM.
J. INT’L L. 529, 530 (2008).
172. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507 (citing Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217,
226 (1996)) (emphasis added).
173. Id.; Rice, supra note 11.
174. S. Rep. No. 102-23, at 14 (1992); see also Rice, supra note 11.
175. S. Rep. No. 102-23, at 14 (1992); see Rice, supra note 11.
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statement that it needs FGM statistics from the countries where the
practices are prevalent to gauge compliance with ICCPR Article
24.176 Although the Human Rights Committee’s statements are not
legally binding on treaty signatories, the Eleventh Circuit has
recognized that their General Comments are a guiding source of
interpretation for the ICCPR.177
D. Congress Likely has the Authority to Pass the FGM Act if the
United States Ratifies CEDAW
The FGM Act, like VAWA, might find firmer footing in
provisions of the signed-but-not-ratified treaty CEDAW.178
CEDAW’s creation was facilitated by the Commission on the Status
of Women (the “CSW”), a group founded in 1946 as a
subcommission of the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights.179 Although the CSW started as a small group of fifteen
representatives from fifteen countries, the CSW has become the
principal global intergovernmental body for promoting women’s
rights.180 As a longtime advocate against FGM, the CSW was
instrumental in supporting a UN General Assembly Agenda titled
Intensifying global efforts for the elimination of female genital
mutilations.181
In 1974, the CSW began drafting CEDAW with the goal of
creating a “single, comprehensive and binding international
instrument” to combat discrimination against women.182 The UN
176. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (2000); see Rice, supra note 11.
177. See United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002); see also
Rice, supra note 11.
178. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; see Johanna Kalb, Human Rights
Treaties in State Courts: The International Prospects of State Constitutionalism After
Medellin, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (2011).
179. A brief history of the Commission on the Status of Women, UN WOMEN,
https://www.unwomen.org/en/csw/brief-history [https://perma.cc/34JG-6BSZ] (last
visited Apr. 5, 2020); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women
-Twentieth
Anniversary
1979-1999,
UNITED
NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw20/history.htm
[https://perma.cc/B3DF-ND8C] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) [hereinafter CEDAW 19791999].
180. Commission
on
the
Status
of
Women,
UN
WOMEN,
https://www.unwomen.org/en/csw [https://perma.cc/36CB-5WHK] (last visited Apr. 5,
2020).
181. G.A. Res. C.3/67/L.21/Rev.1 (Nov. 16, 2012).
182. CEDAW 1979-1999, supra note 179.
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General Assembly adopted CEDAW in 1979 with a vote of 130
Member States in favor of the treaty, zero against the treaty, and
ten abstentions.183 As of 2020, 189 nations have signed, ratified, or
acceded to CEDAW.184 Only two of these 189 nations have signed
but not ratified CEDAW—the United States and Palau.185
Some suggest that opposition to CEDAW ratification in the
United States comes from the “idiosyncratic recommendations”
made by the United Nations Committee to member nations.186 The
United Nations Committee reviews member nations’ compliance
with CEDAW, and provides recommendations on how to better
implement the treaty, sometimes emphasizing controversial issues
like abortion.187 In particular, CEDAW Article 12(1) states that
“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health
care services, including those related to family planning.”188
Professor Ann Elizabeth Mayer counters CEDAW never actually
mentions abortion, pointing to a 1994 Senate Foreign Relations
Committee statement that nothing in CEDAW creates a right to
abortion.189 Professor Mayer acknowledges, however, that this
statement might have been made to appease conservative
Senators’ constituency.190 Others have suggested that the United
States’ delay in ratifying CEDAW is attributable to a history of
“congressional mistrust and hostility toward international treaties,
particularly those concerning human rights issues.”191
183. Id.; Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) about CEDAW, UN WOMEN,
https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/focus-areas/cedaw-human-rights/faq
[https://perma.cc/8LXA-J9WV] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
184. Status of Treaties: 8. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against
Women,
U.N.
TREATY
COLLECTION
(Apr.
12,
2020)
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV8&chapter=4&lang=en [https://perma.cc/WW4V-QB39].
185. Id.; see Mark P. Lagon, Reflections on Global Justice and American Exceptionalism:
The United States as a Model for the World?, WORLD AFFAIRS 42, 47 (2017).
186. Id.
187. Id.; 146 CONG. REC. S3925-02 (Mar. 8, 2000) (Statement of Jesse Helms).
188. CEDAW, supra note 178, art. 12.
189. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Reflections on the Proposed United States Reservations to
CEDAW: Should the Constitution Be an Obstacle to Human Rights?, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
727, 807 (1996).
190. Id.
191. Julia Ernst, U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299, 312 (1995). For another
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If Judge Friedman is correct about the FGM Act exceeding
Congress’ commerce power in Nagarwala, the FGM Act might still
be a valid exercise of Congress’ treaty-implementing authority
under Holland if the United States ratifies CEDAW. Article 2(f) of
CEDAW is the party nations’ commitment to:
condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree
to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy
of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end,
undertake:
(f) . . . all appropriate measures, including legislation, to
modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and
practices which constitute discrimination against women.192

Further, CEDAW Article 5(a) states that:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of
men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.193

Although neither of these provisions specifically reference
FGM, the references to “customs” and “practices” based on
“discrimination” or “stereotyped roles” encompasses FGM more
directly than Articles 3 and 24 of the ICCPR, which broadly refer to
“civil and political rights.”194 In 1990, the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (the “CEDAW
Committee”) explicitly clarified that CEDAW covers the eradication
of FGM in General recommendation 14.195 The CEDAW Committee
recommended that member states should “take appropriate and
effective measures with a view to eradicating the practice of female
circumcision.”196 Nine years later, the CEDAW Committee
argument that CEDAW does not contain a commitment to support abortion, see Rangita de
Silva de Alwis & Amanda M. Martin, “Long Past Time”: CEDAW Ratification in the United
States, 3 U. PENN. J. L. & PUB. AFFAIRS 15, 46 (2018).
192. CEDAW, supra note 178, art. 2(f).
193. CEDAW, supra note 178, art. 5(a).
194. CEDAW, supra note 178, arts. 2(f), 5(a).
195. G.A. Res. 45/38, General recommendation No. 14: Female circumcision (1990),
available
at
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/1_Global/INT_CE
DAW_GEC_3729_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJ3S-HNJP].
196. Id.
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confirmed this interpretation when it issued General
recommendation 19, which states that CEDAW nations should
combat cultural or religious practices like FGM, which carries a
high risk of “death and disability.”197
E. The Post-Ratification Conduct of CEDAW Signatory Nations
Suggests That CEDAW Could be a Basis for an FGM Ban in the
United States
In addition to these clarifying CEDAW recommendations, the
fact that some member nations have based domestic FGM bans on
CEDAW indicates that the treaty should encompass FGM. The
Supreme Court has recognized that the interpretations of treaties
by foreign governments and their courts after ratification are
valuable indicators of the meaning of treaty provisions.198 Even
strict textualists like Justice Scalia utilize this post-ratification
conduct approach.199
An illustration of post-ratification conduct as an interpretive
tool is Zicherman v. Korean Airlines, in which the Supreme Court
considered whether plaintiffs could recover loss-of-society
damages for the death of a family member in a plane crash under
the Warsaw Convention.200 Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention
states that airline carriers “shall be liable for damage sustained in
the event of the death or wounding . . . ”201 In holding that
cognizable damages under the Warsaw Convention should be
determined by the domestic law of the signatory parties, Justice
Scalia’s unanimous decision emphasizes the post-ratification
conduct of the signatory parties as evidence of the meaning of

197. G.A. Res. 54/38/Rev.1, chap. I. General recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the
Convention
(women
and
health)
(1999),
available
at
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/1_Global/INT_CE
DAW_GEC_4738_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3LZ-FLZQ]; U.N. Population Fund, supra note
123.
198. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 (2008); Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.,
Ltd., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996); VED P. NANDA ET AL., LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
IN U.S. COURTS § 10:20 (2019).
199. Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 226.
200. Id. at 218-19.
201. Id. at 221; Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International
Carriage by Air (the “Warsaw Convention”) art. 7, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S.
11 (emphasis added).
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treaty phrase “damage sustained.”202 Justice Scalia points out that
England, Germany, and the Netherlands passed domestic
legislation specifying damages under Warsaw Convention cases,
suggesting that these signatory nations shared this
interpretation.203 Further, Canada passed national legislation
specifying the kinds of plaintiffs entitled to a cause of action under
the Warsaw Convention, but left the question of recoverable
damages for the provinces to decide.204 Justice Scalia and the
unanimous Supreme Court saw the conduct of signatory nations’
legislatures and courts as valuable evidence of a treaty’s meaning,
since “[signatory nations’] conduct generally evinces their
understanding of the agreement they signed.”205
CEDAW signatory nations have recognized the treaty as a
commitment to combat FGM through the implementation of
domestic legislation.206 Ghana, a country where approximately
3.8% of women are victims of FGM,207 ratified CEDAW in 1989.208
Shortly after Ghana’s ratification, Ghanaian President Jerry
Rawlings issued a formal declaration denouncing FGM.209 In 1994,
in response to a CEDAW recommendation, Ghana’s Parliament
reaffirmed its commitment to eradicate FGM by amending its
Criminal Code of 1960 (Act 29) to criminalize FGM, using similar
language to the United States’ FGM Act: “[w]hoever excises,
infibulates[,] or otherwise mutilates the whole or any part of the
labia minora, labia majora[,] and the clitoris of another person
commits an offence and shall be guilty of a second degree felony
and liable on conviction to imprisonment of not less than three
years.”210
202. Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 218-19; Michelle M. Ressler, Compensable Damages
Revisited Under the Warsaw Convention: Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, A New Look at Loss
of Society, 5 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT’L L. 65, 103 (1997).
203. Id.
204. Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 218-19; Ressler, supra note 202, at 103.
205. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989).
206. Matilda Aberese Ako & Patricia Akweongo, The limited effectiveness of legislation
against female genital mutilation and the role of community beliefs in Upper East Region,
Ghana, 17 REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS 47, 47 (2009).
207. Ghana:
The
Law
and
FGM,
28TOOMANY
1
(2018),
https://www.28toomany.org/static/media/uploads/Law%20Reports/ghana_law_report
_v1_(september_2018).pdf [https://perma.cc/EL9N-TR4F] [hereinafter 28TOOMANY].
208. Ako & Akweongo, supra note 206, at 47.
209. Id.
210. Ghana Criminal Code of 1960 (Act 29) § 69(A)(1); Ako & Akweongo, supra note
206, at 47-48.
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Similarly, Senegal’s criminalization of FGM is seen as an
implementation of CEDAW, which Senegal signed in 1980, and
ratified in 1985.211 In Senegal, approximately 22.7% of women
aged fifteen to forty-nine are FGM victims, although prevalence
varies drastically by region (in the southern region of Senegal, FGM
rates are as high as 77.8%).212 In 1999, Senegal amended its Penal
Code to criminalize FGM, although a 2018 report estimates that
fewer than eight prosecutions have taken place under the
statute.213 Other nations responding to CEDAW ratification by
combatting FGM through criminalization, education, and outreach
programs include Benin, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire.214
American courts’ willingness to examine the post-ratification
CEDAW interpretation of these nations is more evidence that
CEDAW could justify Congress’ implementation of the FGM Act.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the DOJ has withdrawn its appeal to the Sixth Circuit
in the Nagarwala case, its letter to the House announcing the
withdrawal contained a proposed amendment to the FGM Act in
light of Judge Friedman’s decision. 215 Instead of simply
criminalizing FGM, the proposed amendment would criminalize
FGM with some nexus to interstate commerce.216 In particular,
section 116(e)(3) of the proposed amendment criminalizes FGM
where “any payment of any kind was made . . . .” for the FGM.217
Daniel Rice argues that this would be an ineffective amendment, as
it would be practically identical to the pre-Nagarwala version of
the statute.218 He points out that it would “almost always” be
211. 28TOOMANY, supra note 207; Ako & Akweongo, supra note 206, at 47.
212. 28TOOMANY, supra note 207.
213. Senegal Criminal Code art. 299; 28TOOMANY, supra note 207.
214. Ako & Akweongo, supra note 206, at 47.
215. Testimony of Professor Beth Van Schaack, Stanford Law School before the Tom
Lantos Human Rights Commission United States House of Representatives Pursuing
Accountability
for
Atrocities
(June
13,
2019),
available
at
https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/sites/humanrightscommission.house.gov/fil
es/documents/PursuingAccountability_VanSchaack.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3F3-MVYU]
[hereinafter Beth Van Schaack Testimony]; Letter from Noel J. Franisco, supra note 33 at
B-1.
216. Beth Van Schaak Testimony, supra note 215; Letter from Noel J. Franisco, supra
note 33, at B-1.
217. Letter from Noel J. Franisco, supra note 33, at C-1.
218. Rice, supra note 11.
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possible to find some connection between FGM and interstate
commerce, regardless of how the statute is written.219
This amendment, however, seems to effectively bring the FGM
Act within Congress’ commerce power under the narrow
“economic in nature” interpretations of Lopez and Morrison
(particularly section 116(e)(3) of the amended FGM Act).220 After
this amendment, the FGM Act is no longer criminalizing FGM in
general, an act which could occur non-economically.221 Section
116(e)(3) of the amendment essentially changes the regulated
activity from “FGM” to “FGM for payment,” which seems to be an
inherently economic activity falling squarely within Congress’
commerce power.222
In the wake of the Nagarwala decision, some states have taken
a step in the right direction by pushing for the criminalization of
FGM.223 State FGM criminalization is essential, since the lack of a
federal ban leaves states without FGM laws at risk of becoming
“destination states” for cutting.224 In Kentucky, eight Republican
and three Democratic senators introduced a bipartisan bill which
would make FGM a felony offense, requiring law enforcement to
undergo training about FGM, and provide FGM victims a 10-year
window to sue.225 State Senator Tom Buford stated that he has not
heard of any opposition to the bill in Kentucky.226 Similarly, the
Washington legislature has introduced a bill which would make

219. Id.
220. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); Letter from Noel J. Franisco,
supra note 33.
221. U.N. Population Fund, supra note 123; G.A. Res, supra note 1.
222. Letter from Noel J. Franisco, supra note 33.
223. Sarah Ladd, Bipartisan group of Kentucky senators introduces bill to ban female
genital mutilation, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.courierjournal.com/story/news/politics/2020/01/14/kentucky-senators-propose-anti-femalegenital-mutilation-bill/4465209002/ [https://perma.cc/MUQ6-7YQN]; Wash. S. 5257,
66th Leg. (2019), available at http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/201920/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/5257.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4AG-254Z].
224. Karen McVeigh, ‘US is moving backwards’: female genital mutilation ruling a blow
to
girls
at
risk,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
22,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/nov/22/us-is-moving-backwards-femalegenital-mutilation-ruling-a-blow-to-girls-at-risk [https://perma.cc/6XCL-TAK6].
225. Ky.
Leg.
20
RS
BR
104,
available
at
https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/recorddocuments/bill/20RS/sb72/orig_bill.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7WR3-9U8L].
226. Ladd, supra note 223.
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FGM a felony.227 FGM is now a state crime in Michigan;228 however,
the state’s ban did not go into effect until after the DOJ brought
federal charges in 2017 against Dr. Nagarwala for performing FGM
in Michigan.229
In some states, however, FGM criminalization has faced
greater hurdles. In Maine, Republican and Democratic state
senators proposed a bill which would make performing FGM,
transporting a minor outside the state for FGM, or consenting to
the FGM of a girl a felony offense.230 The bill passed in Maine’s
Senate, but died in the House.231 Although there was consensus
that the practice should end, some Democrats in the Maine House
opposed the bill because it criminalized “knowingly consenting” to
a girl’s FGM, which some viewed as potentially stigmatizing
immigrants.232 Some also argued that the language imposing
penalties on those who consent to a girl’s FGM might discourage
victims from seeking treatment for their FGM complications to
protect their parents.233 Similarly, a proposed Connecticut bill
which would make FGM a state felony was opposed by testimony
from Susan Yolen of Planned Parenthood of Southern New
England.234 Yolen argued that although the organization opposes
the practice, she believes that FGM criminalization “may only
further isolate those who, now that they are in the U.S., can and
should become more fully integrated into our way of life.”235 Yolen
instead advocated for “public health interventions” to end FGM.236
227. Wash.
S.
5257,
66th
Leg.
(2019),
available
at
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2019-20/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/5257.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UAM7-XZN8].
228. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.136 (2017).
229. Kate Ryan, U.S. Government Backs Off Case of Female Genital Mutilation, REUTERS
(Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-womensrights-fgm/usgovernment-backs-off-case-of-female-genital-mutilation-idUSKCN1RO2LA
[https://perma.cc/T3KB-MQER].
230. NOT REAL NEWS: Maine Legislators Did Not Vote for Mutilation, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Apr. 30, 2018), https://apnews.com/a3f7fab597724dd4bbe32de03cc8f753
[https://perma.cc/4Z5V-23XZ].
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Susan Haigh, Connecticut renews push to ban female genital mutilation,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Feb.
4,
2019),
https://apnews.com/5990eab48a2e41f0993d779ebb064eb8 [https://perma.cc/MV2ZF6US].
235. Id.
236. Id.
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States like Maine and Connecticut must criminalize FGM (like
a majority of US states)237 now that the federal FGM ban has been
held unconstitutional. Kimberly Schaefer, an immigration attorney
in Idaho (which criminalized FGM in 2019)238 argues that
criminalizing FGM in the United States allows women seeking
asylum in the United States to escape FGM in their home country
feel safer.239 Shaefer argues that women coming to the United
States to escape FGM realize that “[the] safety that they thought
they had isn’t really here” in states where the practice is not
criminalized.240 Further, Health Law Professor Sondra Crosby
testified on behalf of a proposed Massachusetts law criminalizing
FGM, pointing out that “enacting a law against FGM could serve as
a deterrent and provide women with a basis to resist cultural
pressure from their families to have their daughters cut.”241 FGM, a
procedure often performed with “scissors, dirty razor blades or
knives, and in unsterile conditions without anesthesia” is a lifealtering physical assault with devastating health consequences.242
Judge Friedman’s decision in Nagarwala signals a need for states
to take the lead in protecting women and girls from this horrific
practice.

237. US
Laws
Against
FGM
–
State
by
State,
EQUALITY NOW,
https://www.equalitynow.org/us_laws_against_fgm_state_by_state
[https://perma.cc/4ENF-QFK4] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020); Jillian McKoy, Criminalizing
FGM Is a Necessary Protective Measure, B. U. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://www.bu.edu/sph/2019/10/03/criminalizing-fgm-is-a-necessary-protectivemeasure/ [https://perma.cc/TY9K-RS9F].
238. Idaho
H.R.
114,
65th
Cong.
(2019),
available
at
https://legislature.idaho.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sessioninfo/2019/legislation/H0114.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DRS4JWLW].
239. Madelyn Beck, Addressing Female Genital Mutilation In the Mountain West, WYO.
PUB. MEDIA (Sept. 4, 2019),
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